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Privatization and Strategic Alliances in
Latin American Telecommunications:
Legal and Contractual Issues that Impact the Business Plan
Emily S. Barbour'
I. Introduction.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the telecommunications industry in Latin
America experienced explosive growth driven by the demand for basic and enhanced ser-
vices. 2 This dynamic growth reflects the forces of technological advancement, market
globalization, privatization, 3 deregulation 4 and liberalization. 5 These political and eco-
1. Emily Barbour is an independent practitioner and principle of the law firm Emily S. Barbour,
P.C., Dallas, Texas. She practices in the area of international business transactions, with
emphasis on foreign strategic investment of telecommunication service providers.
2. In Argentina, before the privatization, pent up demand was such that a telephone customer
might wait from five to ten years for installation of a phone line. LATINFINANCE, ARGENTINA:
THE SILVER GIANT 114 (1996). See also, Melissa Tomlinson, Latin American
Telecommunications: A Study of Deregulation and Privatization in Argentina, Chile and Mexico
(1st ed. 1995) [hereinafter Deregulation Study]; Lisa Sedelnik, Spanish Invasion, LATINFINANCE,
June 1996, 32, 34; David Swafford, Great Potential: Global Players See Latin American
Telecommunications as a Major Growth Market, LATINFINANCE, July/Aug. 1996, at 66.
3. Privatization occurs when the government sells part or all of the shares in the telecommunica-
tions entity to private investors. Eli Noam, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 61 (1992).
4. Noam, supra note 3, at 62. Deregulation can mean a lowering of entry barriers and other
restrictions. It can also mean a reduction in red tape and government involvement.
5. Liberalization changes the nature of the telecommunications market and the power of the
established suppliers by opening equipment supply and services to entry. See Noam, supra
note 3, at 62. For a discussion of the trends in Latin American telecommunications markets see
generally Ignacio Santillana, Lining Up: Connecting Latin America with the Rest of the World,
LATINFINANCE SUPPLEMENTS: TELECOMMUNICATIONS & TECHNOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICA 1995 4
(1995).
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nomic trends have permitted strategic investors from the United States6 and Europe
7
early and considerable market access in Latin America.8 Facing maturing markets in
domestic operations, foreign investors have sought to acquire assets at prices perceived as
undervalued 9 and to develop growth opportunities 10 in international markets.
Although every Latin American government may differ in its approach, timing, and
vision for the sector's structure, the general trend in the telecommunications sector in Latin
America is advancement in stages from state-owned monopoly, to private "transitional
monopoly," and, finally, to competition. The telecommunications sector in various Latin
6. From the United States, Southwestern Bell is a strategic investor in Mexico's Telefonos de
Mexico ("Telmex") privatization. GTE and AT&T are investors in Venezuela's CANTV.
7. From Europe, Telef6nica de Espafia is a strategic investor in the following privatization trans-
actions: Chile's CTC, Telef6nica de Argentina, Venezuelas CANTV, Puerto Rico's TLD and
Telef6nica de Peru. France Telecom is an investor in Mexico's Telmex and Telecom Argentina.
Stet (Italy) is also a strategic investor in Telecom Argentina. See Santillana, supra note 5, at 5.
In late 1995, Entel-Bolivia accepted a capital infusion of US$610 million from Stet (Italy) for a
50% equity stake and management. Jorge A. Segura & Jeffrey W. Barry, Current Trends and
Developments in Privatization, LATINFINANCE SUPPLEMENTS: CORPORATE FINANCE IN LATIN
AMERICA 1996, at 31.
8. Tomlinson, supra note 2, at 3; Santillana, supra note at 5.
9. See generally, Michael E. Gizang & Mercedes M. Pacheco, Privatization in Latin America,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAWYER, June 1996, at 266, 267.
10. See SBC COMMUNICATIONS 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 12, 29 (1996); GTE 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 15
(1996). The rapidly growing economies of some Latin American countries create substantial
demand for telephone service. Low penetration rates among potential telephone users create
unsatisfied demand for basic telephone services. In addition, other services such as cellular
and wireless service, value-added services, data transmission and public pay telephones may
not be fully exploited by the telephone company prior to privatization. During the post-priva-
tization exclusivity period granted in the concession agreement, the privatized company can
build its system with limited competition. These factors combined present significant growth
opportunities for the winning consortium in the privatization bid. See generally, Victoria
Griffith, A Tough Connection, LATINFINANCE May 1996, at 30, 32; David Swafford, Great
Potential, LATINFINANCE July/Aug., at 66, 68, 70.
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American countries has reached different stages of development." The entry of foreign
strategic investors into a Latin American country that is opening its telecommunications
market may be viewed as occurring in three stages: 12 (i) the privatization/monopoly stage;(ii) the strategic alliance stage; and (iii) the competitive entry stage.
In the privatization stage, a lead strategic investor and its consortia acquire an
equity stake in the state-owned telecommunications company. In most Latin American
telecommunications privatizations the pivotal event in the privatization stage has been
the competitive bid to acquire operational control of the privatizing company. After pri-
vatization, generally the privatized company enjoys an "exclusivity period"'13 during
11. Telecom Privatization, NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK, INT'L TRADE MKT., IM960920.005 (Sept. 30,1996) (Rio Grande do Sul to sell 35% voting stock to private sector; France Cables and Radio,
GTE, Korea Telecom, NTT, a consortium led by Stet International S.P.A. and a consortium ledby Telefonica International de Espafia have submitted proposals to prequalify as bidders);Telecom Modernization Project, NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK, INT'L TRADE MKT., IM 960810.031(Sept. 30, 1996) (Ecuador's state-owned telephone company will be split into two companies
and 35% of each will be sold to different operators); "Telecom Privatization:' National TradeData Bank, IT Market IM960919.003 (Sept. 30, 1996) (Panama announced sale of up to 49% of
state-owned Intel, S.A.); Telecom Privatization, NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK, INT'L TRADE MKT.,IM 960419.019 (Sept. 30, 1996) (privatization of El Salvador's Antel is on schedule, with sixbanks selected as semi-finalists: Salomon Bros., Morgan Stanley/ Citibank, Swiss Bank Corp.,BZW, N.M. Rothschild & Sons and T. Henry Schrodor Co.); Chile (1989), Argentina (1990),Mexico (1990), Venezuela (1991), Puerto Rico (1991), Peru (1994) and Bolivia (1995) have
undergone privatization. Santillana, supra note 5, at 5. Other countries that have initiated
steps toward privatization include Brazil, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Panama, Honduras, Paraguay
and El Salvador. Segura & Barry, supra note 7, at 31; Matt Moffett, Brazil's Flabby Phone
Monopoly Courts Investors with Profit, Privatization Talk, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 11, 1996, atA13. See generally, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A GUIDE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (1996).
12. While these stages of market entry are used here for discussion purposes, in actuality, they
overlap. Activities of a strategic investor that generally take place in one stage may sometimes
occur during another stage. The order of events depends partly upon the market entry strate-
gy of the investor and partly upon the occurrence of certain events, such as the capitalization
of a new venture company by its partners and the granting of a concession from the govern-
ment to operate a public telecommunications service.
13. The "exclusivity period" is also sometimes called a "transition period," hence the concept of a
transitional monopoly after the privatization bid and before the entry of competition in the
market for protected services. The duration of the exclusivity period may vary, as may the ser-
vices reserved exclusively to the privatized telephone company.
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which that company is the only concessionaire authorized to offer basic services such as
local telephone service, national long distance and international toll. 14 The exclusivity
period is usually characterized by modernization and expansion of the telecommunica-
tions system and improvements in availability and quality of service.
During the second stage, new competitor companies form as a result of strategic
alliances formed in and by the private sector. New competitors are often consortia of in-
country, local partners who interrelate in and know the local business environment and for-
eign strategic investors, including telecommunications companies with technical and man-
agerial expertise and financial partners. The negotiation of strategic alliances generally
begins during the exclusivity period while the privatized company is still protected. The
formation of joint ventures and associations between Latin companies and their foreign
partners may be lengthy and complex, particularly when there are multiple parties on both
sides of the venture. Companies sometimes undergo negotiations with more than one part-
ner before finding the right fit. Before the commencement of competitive services, two or
14. Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Puerto Rico and Bolivia are examples of countries in the privatiza-
tion/monopoly stage. In Argentina, the monopoly concessions of privatized Telefonica,
Telecom and Telintar expire in November 1997, but under current law can be renewed until
2000. Many law makers and politicians support the introduction of full competition in 1997,
and will be debating legislation to reform the telecommunications industry, according to Juan
Manuel Valcarcel, Chairman of the Communications Committee of the Argentine House of
Representatives. See Juan Manuel Valcarcel, Calling Someone in Argentina? Dial M for
Monopoly, WALL STREET JOURNAL, August 16, 1996, at A9. See also, Alejandra Herrera, The
Privatization of Telecommunications Services - The Case of Argentina, Vol. 28 COLUMBIA JOURNAL
oF WORLD BUSINESS No. 1 (Spring 1993) [hereinafter Case of Argentina]. In Venezuela, CANTV
was partially privatized in 1991 when the VenWorld consortium, led by GTE, bought 40% of
CANTV's stock. The Venezuelan Investment Fund and Lehman Brothers/S.G. Warbury hve
signed a contract for the placement of the remaining government-owned CANTO shares in
the international markets. NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK, INT'L TRADE MKT., IM 906701.019
(June 28, 1996). CANTV will continue to be Venezuela's exclusive provider of basic telecom-
munications services until the year 2000. See GLOBAL TELECOMS BUSINESS: THE AMERICAS
YEARBOOK 55 (Edward Russell - Walling et al. eds., 1996). In 1994 a consortium led by
Telef6nica de Espafia bought controlling stakes in each of Peru's state-owned local and long
distance companies. Telef6nica del Peru was then formed by the merger of those companies.
The Peruvian government completed its telecommunications privatization process in July 1996
by selling the remaining 29% government stake in a $1.1 billion international stock offering.
Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., Peru's Telefonica Concludes $1.1 Billion Global Offering, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, July 2, 1996, at A8; 1996 Latin Financing Review, No. 79 LATINFINANCE, July/Aug.
1996, at 60-61. Telefonica del Peru's privatized monopoly in the long distance and local mar-
kets is scheduled to open to competition from June 1999 onwards. See NATIONAL TRADE DATA
BANK, INT'L TRADE MKT., IS 970716.276 (July 19, 1996); GLOBAL TELECOMs BUSINESS, supra, at
37,45. In Puerto Rico, Telef6nica de Espafia acquired a 79% stake in Telef6nica Larga Distancia
de Puerto Rico ("TLD") in the 1992 privatization. Currently PRTC has a monopoly on local
service and TLD has a monopoly on long distance services. Id. Stet, the Italian state holding
company, bought 50% of Bolivia's Entel in 1995. The privatized telecommunications company
has a monopoly on long distance, paging, cable and cellular services for six years. Id. at 9.
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more strategic alliances that would otherwise compete in the opening market may combine
to create a larger and more powerful presence in the market place.15 One critical event that
characterizes the strategic alliance stage is the execution of joint venture agreements and
association agreements among consortia of local and foreign partners.
In the competitive entry stage, 16 new competitor companies implement their
business plans, commence operations and emerge in the market place to provide compet-
itive services. This stage may begin a year or more before the expiration of the monopoly
period and continue as competition is permitted in the market place. This stage is char-
acterized by the execution and performance of contracts between the partners in the new
competitor company relating to the operation of the company, the application to the
telecommunications regulatory authority for the requisite concessions and authorizations
to provide telecommunications services 17 and, most importantly, the offering of services.
In each of the privatization/monopoly stage, the strategic alliance stage and the
competitive entry stage, specific legal and contractual issues impact upon the business
plan and the financial viability of the investment. These key issues generally apply to all
participants who seek to enter the market in a given country at that particular stage of
development of the sector. Transactional counsel to a strategic investor in telecommuni-
cations in the Americas coordinates closely with business executives and in house counsel
about these issues and their impact on the valuation of the investment opportunity and
the business plan.
This article discusses telecommunications privatization, strategic alliances and
start up operations of emerging competitor companies in the Americas. It examines,
with respect to each stage of sector development, certain laws, regulations and contractual
obligations that create critical issues for potential strategic investors who seek to enter the
market during that stage. It identifies factors that can make the investment a viable
opportunity for the foreign investor, and cites as examples the experiences of some major
investors in several Latin American countries. Finally, it analyzes how the legal and con-
tractual framework impacts the financial projections and business plan of the strategic
investor in each stage, in effect, driving the investment decision.
15. For example, during the strategic alliance stage following the Mexican privatization, GTE
Corporation of the United States and Mexico's Grupo Financiero Bancomer and its sister com-
pany Valores Industriales in early 1995 formed one venture, Unicom Telecomunicaciones, to
enter the Mexican telecommunications market and compete in long distance services effective
in August 1996. AT&T and Mexican Grupo Alfa had negotiated a separate venture, known as
Alestra. In April 1996, the companies released the news that Unicorn would combine with the
Alestra venture to form one telecommunications powerhouse. See Craig Torres, Mexican
Phone Competition Heats Up, WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 23, 1996, at A18; New Lines of
Communication, DALLAS MORNING NEws, April 23, 1996, at 1D.
16. Chile and Mexico are in the competitive entry stage. For a detailed discussion of the companies
entering Mexico's telecommunications market in January 1997 to compete in long distance and
other services, see Stephen I. Glover & JoEllen Lotvedt, The Mexican Telecommunications
Market-The Interplay of Internal Reform and NAFTA, NAFTA: LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE
AMERICAS [hereinafter Mexican Telecommunications Market], supra at 23.
17. Id., at 30 (discussion of the concessions to operate as public telecommunications service
providers recently granted in Mexico.) See also Mexico Telecom Partnerships Forming Rapidly,
INTER-AMERICAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAw, June 14, 1996, at 602, 604.
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II. Privatization.
The privatization process in Latin American telecommunications began in the
late 1980s, 18 and continues to progress. 19 The privatization trend serves to implement
governmental objectives that include obtaining massive capital infusion, 2 0 reducing
country debt, introducing competition in the telecommunications sector, eliminating
employees from government payrolls, increasing business efficiency of telecommunica-
tions companies, expanding and updating networks, improving service and benefitting
from technical expertise of international operators.
2 1
18. Chile was the first Latin American country to privatize its state-owned monopoly telephone
companies. In 1988, Compania de Telefonos de Chile S.A. and Empresa Nacional de
Telecomunicaciones S.A., respectively, Chile's largest government-owned local and long distance
telephone companies, were sold to the private sector. Tomlinson, supra note 2, at 4. See gener-
ally, Sale of the Century, WALL STREET JOURNAL, October 2, 1995, at R1-R4.
19. Supra notes 11 and 14. Despite the actions of some governments in preparing for privatiza-
tion, some commentators predict that the privatization process in Latin America will
encounter obstacles, such as (1) a lack of properties for sale as attractive as those initially
offered, (2) the Mexican peso devaluation of 1995 and the perception of economic instability
that it caused, even with respect to other countries in Latin America, and (3) political instabili-
ty in certain countries. Gizang & Pacheco, supra note 9, at 269. Other commentary suggests
that because of the passage of the United States federal telecommunications bill in February
1996, United States telecommunications giants will forego international expansion in favor of
new opportunities to compete in domestic local and long distance markets and to consolidate
in mergers. See, e.g., Home is Where the Heart is for US Telcos, GLOBAL TELECOMS BUSINESS,
June/July 1996, at 17.
20. In 1994, Peru received $2.002 billion in the privatization of the state-owned local and long dis-
tance companies CPT and Entel from the Telef6nica de Peru consortium, led by Telef6nica de
Espafia. See Lisa Sedelnik, Ringing with Success: CPT/Entel Privatization Opens Lines of
Communication in Peru, LATINFINANCE, Jan./Feb. 1995, at 18.
21. For further discussion of governmental objectives for privatization, see GLOBAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 152 (Merheroo Jusswalla ed.,
1993),(comparing the rationale for telecommunication privatization in Chile, Argentina and
Mexico); Jorge Kunigami Kunigami, Presentation Paper for Latin American Telecommunications:
Opportunities for Investment, Trade and Development (presented by the Institute of the Americas
in cooperation with the U.S. Commercial Service and the Organization of American States), Nov.
2-3, 1995, (Chairman of the Board of the Peruvian telecommunications regulatory body, OSIP-
TEL, noting governmental objectives including expansion and improvement of the quality of ser-
vice, promotion of private investment, change from monopoly to free competition, investment in
rural telecommunications, rebalance tariffs and contribute to belief and investment in the national
economy) [hereinafter Kunigami Paper]; Thomas J. Casey & Simone Wu, Telecommunications
Privatizations: An Overview, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 781, 782-84 (1994); Scott
Beardsley and Michael Patsalos-Fox, Getting Telecoms Privatization Right, THE MCKINSEY
QUARTERLY 1995 NUMBER 1; Tim Taylor, The Ring of Success, LATIN FINANCE SUPPLEMENTS Jan.-Feb.
1995, at 28. See generally, COMISION DE PROMOCION DE LA INVERSION PRIVADA (COPRI), LA
PRIVITIZACION EN EL PERO, VERSION REVISADA 8 (April 1993) (explaining the Peruvian government's
objectives for its multi-sector privatization program); Gizang & Pacheco, supra note 9, at 267.
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The legal form of a privatization depends upon the government's objectives. In
Latin America, a primary goal has been the modernization and expansion of the telecom-
munications infrastructure with the technical experience of an international operator
from the United States or Europe.22 The experienced operator and its consortia are
uniquely positioned to develop the infrastructure to maximize the value of the privatized
telephone company. The sale of a controlling interest in the privatized company to a pre-
qualified 23 operator, through private negotiation, or, more commonly, international bid,
is the legal form of privatization that best meets these objectives.
For a privatization to succeed, the privatized company must present a sound
investment for the pre-qualified bidders. Buyers seek an economically attractive invest-
ment in a stable legal and political regime. Officers and directors of the strategic investor
base the investment decision on the recommendations of the team that performs due dili-
gence and evaluates the opportunity. That team formulates a base case scenario along
with multiple alternative scenarios that incorporate drivers based upon assumptions
about variables such as order backlog, demand and risk-adjusted cost of capital, to pro-
ject earnings. The team then arrives at a valuation of the company based upon the pro-
jected future revenue stream discounted to present-day value and the terminal value of
the privatized company's assets. Conditions in the enabling legislation, minimum bid
price, assumption of debt, restrictions on tariff increases and requirements to retain
employees after privatization are some examples of factors that impact both the decision
whether to bid and the investor's valuation of the opportunity.
22. Santillana, supra note 5, at 4. Ignacio Santillana, chief executive officer of Telef6nica
Internacional, the dominant strategic investor in Latin America telecommunications opera-
tions notes that, "Before the privatization of their telephone operators, most Latin American
countries had few telecommunications services. Besides Argentina, none of the countries had
penetration levels of more than 10%; long waiting lists and obsolete networks were common-
place. With privatization most of these problems were solved when major international tele-
phone operators initiated significant capital expenditure programs and brought in new man-
agement methods to these previously inefficient and unprofitable companies.' Id.
23. In the case of international public bid, the government usually requires potential bidders to
"prequalify" by meeting criteria as to technical experience and financial capability before par-
ticipating in the due diligence review of the company or companies being privatized.
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A. IMPACT OF LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON VALUATION.
During the due diligence period,2 4 pre-qualified bidders usually have the oppor-
tunity to negotiate aspects of the legal and regulatory framework in which the privatized
company will operate. In Latin America, the privatized telephone company and the gov-
ernment generally enter into a concession agreement. The government provides the pre-
qualified bidders successive drafts of the concession for review and comment, usually
during the due diligence review of the telephone company. Changes that are negotiated
in the concession affect the bidder's view of the opportunity and the valuation of the
company. Other issues upon which the prequalified bidders may comment include por-
tions of the telecommunications act and implementing regulations, rules governing the
formation and powers of the independent telecommunications regulatory authority and
interconnection regulations and the concession agreement. 25 The outcome of these
negotiations also impacts the potential bidder's assessment of the investment opportunity
and, therefore, its bid amount.
24. A company preparing for privatization usually secures the legal and financial audit of indepen-
dent advisors before prequalified bidders undertake due diligence review of the company.
Nevertheless, the potential bidder and its consortia make a thorough investigation of the compa-
ny undergoing privatization. The legal review of the company may include, without limitation,
material agreements, including existing concession agreements of the company undergoing pri-
vatization, concessions in effect or promised to other companies, interconnection agreements,
and supply contracts (see infra note 63), pending litigation and contingent liabilities, labor mat-
ters including collective bargaining agreements and labor environment, severance obligations,
insurance, intellectual property, real property, environmental liabilities, tax liabilities, foreign
debt exposure and settlements among carriers. Local "in country" counsel is important in the
review of the privatized company. The prequalified bidder must formulate a plan for the man-
agement of significant legal exposures. In addition to the company, the prequalified bidder and
its advisors review the legal and regulatory environment. This review includes, without limita-
tion, the constitutional framework, the privatization law, the foreign investment regime (includ-
ing matters such as repatriation of capital, technology transfer, legal stability, registration of
investment and investment insurance), expropriation law, import laws, antitrust law and regula-
tion, securities law, telecommunications law and regulations, corporate law (including type of
legal entity and applicable law, shareholders, corporate control, directors, general managers,
external auditors, accounting and disclosure requirements and merger law), tax laws (including
income tax law, equity tax, if any, value-added tax, municipal taxes, real estate taxes and import
duties) and labor and collective bargaining laws (including right to work, hiring foreigners, salary
and benefits, labor relations law). Finally, the prequalified bidder reviews the transaction struc-
ture. This evaluation covers, among other things, the stock purchase agreement, control issues,
and the corporate structure of the company being privatized. If more than one company is for
sale in the privatization (such as the local and long distance companies), then the prequalified
bidder will also evaluate any plans for post-sale merger or consolidation of the company or com-
panies being privatized in light of the corporate laws and any restriction that the government
might place upon the powers of the privatized company to consolidate.
25. Prequalified bidders also have the opportunity to negotiate the stock purchase agreement and
ancillary sale documents. The focus of this analysis, however, is the legal and regulatory frame-
work in which the privatized company will operate.
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B. AUTHORIZED SCOPE OF BUSINESS.
Because it defines, among other things, the scope of business, the concession is
important in valuing future earnings of the business. The strategic investor generally
favors broad definition of the services that the privatized company will be authorized to
offer. Both the strategic investor and the public consuming the services stand to benefit if
the authorized scope of the privatized company's business includes new services created
by technological developments in telecommunications, and the carrier system infrastruc-
ture is permitted to consist of and utilize all forms of telecommunications media. The
concession agreement (or the telecommunications law and regulations) should clearly
define the authorized services. Clarity of definition of services avoids confusion between
basic services that are protected during the exclusivity period and competitive services.
C. COMPETITION.
The effectiveness of restrictions on competition during the exclusivity period
assures the economic viability of that period. The privatized company relies upon an
exclusivity period during which the competitive boundaries are strong enough to control
competitive entry so that the operator may direct and concentrate its capital26 and
human and technical resources on expanding and modernizing the network.27 Successful
infrastructure expansion and modernization to ensure broad coverage of service mutually
benefits the operator and the customer base. The broader the coverage of service to all
sectors of the economy, the stronger an economic driver for the country the telephone
system becomes.
The exclusivity period is particularly important where local service is drastically
underpriced and subsidized by national and international long distance service. If com-
petition is allowed in the national and international toll markets, the telephone company
risks rapid loss of customers and revenue streams needed to develop the basic telecom-
26. As part of the Peru telecommunications privatization, three concessions were signed, each of
which contained expansion mandates. The Telef6nica consortium is required to invest an
additional $1.5 billion in the telecommunications infrastructure through 2000. Sedelnik, supra
note 20, at 18.
27. The concession agreement typically requires the concessionaire to expand and modernize the
network and advance line penetration as a condition of the concession. In Mexico, Telmex was
required to expand the number of lines in service 12% each year between August 1990 and
December 1994. Deregulation Study, supra note 2, at 2. For further discussion of moderniza-
tion requirements associated with Mexico's telecommunications privatization, see Rafael X.
Zahraldin & C. Todd Jones, Venture Capital Opportunities and Mexican Telecommunications
After the Passage of NAFTA and the Ley de Inversion Extranjera, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 899, 921-24
(1995), and Brent Lee Vannoy, Mexican Telecommunications: Privatization and NAFTA Open
the Door for U.S. Expansion into Mexican Markets, 17 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 309, 321-22 (1994).
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munications infrastructure. 28 The host country receives massive investment in the
telecommunications infrastructure and improved service upon which a competitive mar-
ket may be built in exchange for the protected period.
The investment is more attractive when the rules clearly state (i) when and
under what circumstances the government will permit additional concession holders to
build network infrastructures in competition with the privatized company and (ii) what
services are permitted to be provided through the competing infrastructure. If the gov-
ernment has issued or promised concessions to other public telecommunications services
providers, the government should disclose the terms of those concessions to potential
bidders as part of the due diligence.29 The concession may be negotiated so that the gov-
ernment has the right to grant other concessions during the exclusivity period only if the
privatized company is unable or unwilling to provide the services. After the exclusivity
period, other concessions for public telecommunications services should be nondiscrimi-
natory and on terms no more favorable than the terms granted to the privatized compa-
ny.
D. MODERNIZATION, EXPANSION AND SERVICE QUALITY MANDATES AND
PENALTIES.
The concession agreement usually contains important mandates for network
expansion and modernization. The consequence of not meeting the mandates may be
cash penalties or even cancellation of the concession. The prequalified bidder will negoti-
ate that penalties for failure to meet performance operations should not apply if the cause
of the failure is events beyond the control of the concessionaire, such as a delay in switch
deliveries. In any event, the time period for installation of new equipment and expansion
of the network should be reasonable while consistent with governmental objectives to
develop the country's telecommunications infrastructure.
Since expansion mandates are government projections, they may not reflect
demand. Actual market demand for expanded service may be less (either overall or in cer-
tain locations) than the mandated quantities. Investment of capital and technology in
excess of actual and projected demand wastes valuable resources. Therefore, the investment
represents a more valuable opportunity to the strategic investor if the privatized company is
deemed to meet the expansion mandates so long as it satisfies market demand.
28. Latin American governments have to weigh the perceived advantages of introducing competi-
tion against the need to protect profits that finance the extension of their networks to poorer
and more remote citizens. Latin American Telecoms Half-Way There, THE ECONOMIST, (Feb. 4,
1995) 62, at 63. In Argentina, the government granted Telecom and Telef6nica monopolistic
powers for the provision of international telephone and data transmission, even as those com-
panies controlled basic domestic services. Herrera, supra note 14, at 51. The explicit goal of
the concessions was to allow the companies to pay for network expansion through cross-subsi-
dies from international services to domestic services. Id. The concession agreements require
the domestic service companies to use the surplus from the international services company to
meet modernization and expansion goals. Id.
29. See supra note 24.
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The concession agreement also usually contains service quality mandates.
Frequently the pre-privatization state-owned telephone company will not have kept accu-
rate records with which to measure existing quality levels, so the base line from which to
measure quality improvement is unclear. In such case, the first year of privatization may
be used to accurately measure quality levels and agree upon starting points for quality
improvement. Contractual penalties for failure to meet service quality mandates should
not be excessive or greater than the value of the services being provided. The amount of
the penalty is an important factor, since excessive penalties pose a significant financial
risk that can undermine the valuation of a privatization opportunity.
In addition to penalties for failure to meet expansion, modernization and service
quality requirements, the concession may authorize the government to levy fines against
the privatized company for other breaches of the concession agreement. Grounds for
imposition of these penalties may include, for example, the unauthorized transfer of the
concession agreement, the engagement of the privatized company in unfair competition,
the occurrence of unexcused service interruptions, the charging of amounts higher than
approved tariffs, the failure to pay taxes or concession fees, the violation of labor law or
collective bargaining agreements, and other material breaches. Penalties present less risk
to the concessionaire if the concession agreement provides for written notice of violations
and an opportunity to cure the breach before the government imposes the penalty. If the
concession imposes penalties for breach of its terms, then to avoid penalizing the opera-
tor twice, it should also provide that in a suit for damages for breach of the concession
agreement, recovery will be limited to actual damages. In general, penalties in the conces-
sion agreement should not duplicate penalties already provided in the telecommunica-
tions laws and regulations.
E. FEES.
Another important concession issue is the taxes, royalties and fees that the con-
cessionaire is obligated to pay. One such fee is the concession fee for the right to commer-
cially operate public telecommunications service. One negotiation point is the computa-
tion of the fee: whether it is a percentage of net revenue actually collected or of gross rev-
enue invoiced. Monies that the concessionaire collects on behalf of other telecommuni-
cations service providers under interconnection agreements should be excluded from the
computation of net revenues. Another issue that the prequalified bidder may negotiate is
whether the fee will be assessed only upon final services or upon all services authorized in
the concession agreement (other than interconnection charges). The prequalified bidder
is also concerned with whether the fee to operate public telecommunications service
applies to services for which the law imposes a separate fee, such as a fee for the use of the
radio-electric spectrum.
To finance the supply of telecommunications services in rural and social interest
areas, the government may assess a fee computed as a percentage of revenues from
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telecommunications services. In such cases, the states may require the concessionaire to
contribute that fee to a telecommunications investment fund. 30 The same issues dis-
cussed in connection with concession fees in the preceding paragraph apply with respect
to telecommunications service fund fees. The pre-qualified bidder may also negotiate for
a right of first refusal to develop, install and operate projects using monies in the telecom-
munications investment fund. In any event, the prequalified bidder may negotiate for a
contractual commitment that the government will allocate penalties paid by the priva-
tized telephone company for the failure to satisfy modernization, expansion and service
quality mandates to the telecommunications investment fund instead of to the general
coffers of the telecommunications regulatory agency or the general treasury.
The fees provided in the concession should generally be consistent with the
telecommunications act and regulations. As the government and pre-qualified bidders
negotiate the concession and regulatory structure, sometimes not all changes are incorpo-
rated consistently throughout the entire scheme at the same time. If the basis for fees con-
tained in the concession agreement differs from the basis in the act and regulations, clari-
fication is in order.
F. GOVERNMENTAL RIGHTS TO UNILATERALLY MODIFY AND TERMINATE THE
CONCESSION.
The ability of the government to unilaterally modify the concession, and the cir-
cumstances under which the government may terminate the concession are also critical.
Unilateral changes based on a political perception of the "public interest" create risk for
the strategic investor and lower the valuation of the investment opportunity.
Modifications to the concession should result in a corresponding financial compensation
to the concessionaire and the elimination of concession obligations.
The strategic investor seeks assurance that the government cannot terminate the
concession or eliminate concession rights except under clearly defined circumstances. The
only grounds upon which the government may exercise an early termination option should
be the concessionaire's failure to meet material and specifically delineated criteria, and not
based upon vague standards. The concessionaire's failure to achieve of expansion mandates
should not be grounds for early termination if the mandates exceed actual market demand.
30. In Peru, for example, art. 12 of the Ley de Telecom unicaciones provides that operators of carrier
services and final public services must pay a percentage of the total annual billing to the Fondo
de Inversi6n de Telecomunicaciones ("FITEL"), a fund for telecommunications investment. The
fund serves solely to finance telecommunications projects for rural areas and locations of
social interest, art. 214 of Peru's Regulamentos de la Ley Telecomunicaciones provides that the
fee is 1.5 % of the total annual gross income for each year. Regulamento de la Ley
Telecomunicaciones (1993) (Pert6). The FITEL fund serves one of the government's stated
objectives in its restructuring of the telecommunications sector: promotion of investment in
rural telecommunications. See Kunigami paper, supra note 21.
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Termination rights are more acceptable to the investor if they provide for written notice and
a reasonable opportunity to cure any breach.
G. RATE REGULATION.
Rate regulation and the rebalancing of tariffs is an important part of preparing
the privatized company and the market for the introduction of competition. The rate
structure in most pre-privatization Latin American countries is similar to that in the pre-
divestiture United States: rates for high-cost services such as local telephone service are
below the cost of supplying the service. Local service is subsidized by national long dis-
tance and international toll services, subjecting the latter to competitive vulnerability.
To regulate rates, the regulator may use a price cap regulatory regime. 3 1 During
the transition period, services 32 are divided into baskets and an average weight is estab-
lished for each regulated service. After the transition period, the regulator applies a price
cap formula to establish the maximum permissible price (the cap) for the weighted aver-
age of rates in each basket. 3 3 Rates for other services may be set by the privatized compa-
ny in accordance with maximum fixed prices established by the regulator.
Most countries restructuring their telecommunications regulatory systems have
attempted to separate the provision of domestic services from international services.
3 4
The theory supporting separation of services is that earnings from international service
have always financed the development of the domestic network and it is not fair for some
users to subsidize others. 35 The new arrangement is intended to reduce the price of inter-
national cas.
36
Similarly, cross-subsidies can exist between services reserved exclusively to the
privatized company and competitive services. Under rate-of-return regulation, the costs
of providing a service that the privatized company reports to the government are recover-
able through the rate charged for the service. 37 If the imbedded carrier also offers com-
petitive services (such as value-added services), regulators seek to prevent the privatized
31. Traditional rate regulation is based on rate of return. The carrier is permitted to establish its
rates at a level that will return revenues sufficient to cover costs plus a reasonable return on
investment. Because rate of return regulation effectively guarantees the carrier's recovery of all
costs, it can inflate rates by encouraging over-investment. Regulators have adopted the price
cap (or incentive) system of regulation to replicate the cost savings aspects of a competitive
environment. See Charles H. Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (Artech House 1996), at 156-157.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Herrara, supra note 14, at 51. The Argentine case, however, runs counter to international
trends, in that the expansion of the network is being financed through cross-subsidies.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Kennedy & Pastor, supra note 31, at 157.
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company from allocating the cost of competitive services to the reported costs for
reserved services.3 8 The regulator seeks to prevent the privatized company from recover-
ing misallocated costs for competitive services from the monopoly ratepayers and from
distorting fair competition.
39
From the viewpoint of the strategic investor, the investment opportunity is
attractive where the concession company will have the maximum flexibility to reduce
costs, adjust prices, expand services and offer new products. The pre-qualified bidder will
favor a rate regulation structure that permits the concession :ompany to offset price
reductions in services burdened with cross-subsidies with increases in under-priced ser-
vices. In negotiating the rate regime, the prequalified bidder also seeks protection from
inflation with language in the section of the concession agreement pertaining to rates that
permits rate increases to offset inflation.
H. INTERCONNECTION.
Another important factor relating to the introduction of competition is the right
of new market entrants to interconnect with the network of the privatized dominant car-
rier. Usually the government promulgates regulations to provide for competition to
develop fairly in the market. The dominant carrier is legally required to provide other
public telecommunications service providers and cellular operators access to its switching
and transmission facilities. 40 These requirements may appear in the telecommunications
38. Id.
39. Regulators have addressed this situation in several ways. One way is to prohibit the privatized
company from providing competitive services. This solution can have the unwanted effect of
lessening availability of services in the face of consumer demand.
Another solution is to permit the privatized company to offer competitive services only
through separate subsidiaries with their own personnel, facilities and accounting ledgers. This
scenario raises the cost to the privatized company of providing competitive services because of
the duplication of staff and facilities. While more attractive than preventing the privatized
company from offering competitive service, this approach may actually create economic ineffi-
ciencies. A third method is to allow the same organization that provides reserved services to
provide competitive services, but to require separate cost accounting. This solution allows the
privatized company the greatest flexibility to provide competitive services and meet market
demand at market prices. See generally id. at 157-158.
40. In Peru, for example, the dominant carrier and the carrier seeking interconnection have 60
days to negotiate an interconnection agreement. Once the agreement is signed, the telecom-
munications regulator, Organismo Supervisor de Inversion Privada en Telecom unicaciones
("OSIPTEL") has 30 days to agree or require the parties to modify the agreement. If the 60 day
period expires and the parties have not agreed about the interconnection terms, then OSIPTEL
will issue an interconnection regulation. Either party may request OSIPTEL to participate in
the negotiations to contribute to the understanding and agreement of the parties. See
Regulamentos de la Ley Telecomunicaciones art. 110 (1993) (Per).
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act, the implementing regulations and the concession agreement.
Interconnection is a mechanism through which the dominant carrier may estab-
lish limits to increased competition. Because the dominant carrier can impose unfavor-
able terms on emerging competitors, in the United States interconnection technology and
fees are highly regulated. By contrast, the trend in the Latin American approach to inter-
connection is to permit competing carriers to privately negotiate an interconnection
agreement in accordance with certain parameters established in the regulations. 41 If the
parties do not agree within a specified period of time, then the regulator will establish the
terms and conditions of interconnection (including rates) and publish an order or regula-
tion containing the terms.4
2
In negotiating interconnection rules, the dominant carrier seeks a framework that
permits it to charge an interconnection fee that includes its fully allocated costs in providing
the interconnection and a contribution for the universal service obligation, 43 and provides
for a reasonable profit margin. Regulatory provisions governing interconnection arrange-
ments are more attractive to the strategic investor if the regulator refrains from intervening
unless either party requests intervention. Similarly, a framework in which the regulator
reviews, but does not have approval of the interconnection agreement, is more attractive. At
a minimum, the prequalified bidder will assert that regulatory approval should not be
required for interconnection agreements that comply with approved tariffs.
I. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AS A WHOLE.
The concession agreement is a critical element in valuing the future earnings
stream of the privatized company. Concurrently with the negotiation of the concession
agreement, the government may also be enacting or fine-tuning the telecommunications
act and regulations, as well as other laws that encourage private and foreign investment.
To evaluate the investment opportunity and the risk, the prequalified bidder considers the
concession in the context of the legal and regulatory framework as a whole. The interplay
of the concession with the legal framework is also a factor in valuing the opportunity,
41. For example, in Peru, art. 109 of the Regulamento General de la Ley de Telecomunicaciones pro-
vides that interconnection agreements should address (1) interconnection capacity and provi-
sions for future requirements, sufficient to permit reasonable quality transmission of traffic
between networks, (2) interconnection points, (3) effective date and term of the interconnec-
tion, (4) matters affecting the signals transmitted and received, including routing arrange-
ments, transmission, synchronization, signaling, numbering, rates, service quality, and
telecommunications security, (5) guaranty of each party to maintain quality of services, (6)
fees and economic terms of the interconnection and (7) periodic review of performance of
contract conditions. Id.
42. Id.
43. See supra note 30.
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especially if it appears that the privatized company might incur duplicative penalties or




Although usually viewed as a less lucrative growth opportunity than winning a
privatization bid,45 a foreign investor may form a strategic alliance with an in-country
partner to compete with the embedded supplier upon the expiration of the exclusivity
period. 46 Since value-added services are usually not subject to the concession's exclusivi-
44. For example, in addition to its antitrust law, Legislative Decree No. 701, pub. Nov. 7, 1991, effective
July 19, 1992 (the 'Antitrust Law"), Peru's Telecommunications Law and Telecommunications
Regulations contain antitrust provisions. The Ley de Telecom unicaciones, Decree Law No. 26096,
published on May 6, 1993, contains several provisions of an antitrust nature. It states that teleser-
vices or final services, diffusion services and value-added services must be provided in free compe-
tition. See at Articles 14, 21, and 30. Art. 11 (relating to interconnection) provides that conces-
sionaires of carrier services guaranty free competition among all providers of final, diffusion and
value added services. Art. 38 provides that providers of carrier and teleservice or final services
must, if they intend to provide value-added services, guaranty that they will not use their status as
providers of the former services to obtain advantages over other providers of value-added services,
thereby impeding fair competition. Moreover, Ch. IV of Title II of the Telecommunications Law is
fully devoted to antitrust issues. Art. 69 prohibits business practices that restrict fair competition
and authorizes OSIPTEL to adopt corrective measures. The Regulamentos de la Ley
Telecomunicaciones contain antitrust provisions similar to those found in the Ley de
Telecomunicaciones. Art. 228 provides that OSIPTEL shall supervise and control the market for
telecommunications services and adopt corrective measures. Article 229 specifies that "For what is
not provided in the [Telecommunications Law] and the Regulations as relates to the prohibition
of business practices that restrict free competition, there shall be applied the provisions of the Law
against monopolistic practices that control or restrict free competition' Id. One reading of this
provision is that (1) with respect to antitrust matters, the Telecommunications Law, its
Regulations and the Antitrust Law all apply to the telecommunications sector, and (2) both OSIP-
TEL and the Antitrust Division have a role in antitrust enforcement in the telecommunications
sector, with the division of responsibility to be established.
45. Griffith, supra note 10, at 32 (Latin American telecommunications stocks are losing their clout
due to maturation of the region's markets and the industry and the introduction of competi-
tion). But see Great Potential, LATINFINANCE, July/Aug. 1996, at 66 (Even though privatization
and increased competition has pushed profits of local telephone companies down, the growing
technological capacity and volume of traffic in countries that have loosened regulations will
benefit the entire sector and growth prospects are strong).
46. Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 16, at 30-34 for a discussion of the strategic alliances poised to
enter Mexico's long distance market in January 1997. In Chile, the introduction of competi-
tion in long distance services triggered a price war. In response, some Chilean telecommunica-
tions groups have formed key international alliances such as the March 1996 announcement of
a transaction between CTC and VTR owned by SBC Corporation and the Chilean Luksic con-
glomerate to pool resources in the mobile telephone business. Griffith, supra note 10, at 32.
See also Scott Week & Maria Suarez, Dialing In: Competition Heats Up for Benchmark Latin
Telecom Giants, LATINFINANCE, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 84-86.
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ty, the strategic alliance may base its initial business on value-added services while it pre-
pares to enter into competition with the dominant carrier upon the expiration of exclu-
sivity of basic services. During this period, the strategic investor enters into a formal
association with its local partner, forms the new joint venture company and develops its
business plan. The likelihood of forming a successful strategic alliance increases when the
investor find one or more partners47 who negotiate an association or joint venture agree-
ment 48 satisfactory to all parties to the association.
A. CONTEXT OF THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE.
As background, it is useful to consider the context in which the association aris-
es. The United States or other foreign investor structures its partnership with a local
47. An important aspect of partner selection is locating partners with complementary skills, such
as the association between foreign technological experts and domestic partners with access to
local markets and knowledge. Another key factor is compatible corporate culture and philoso-
phy, which includes symmetry in size of companies, financial capability, internal work environ-
ment, complementary management styles, performance measurement and correction mecha-
nisms and mutual trust. The partners should share compatible goals and vision for the new
business and should bear commensurate levels of risk. See Keith D. Brouthers, Lance Eliot
Brouthers & Timothy J. Wilkinson, Strategic Alliances: Choose Your Partners, 28 Long Range
Planning 18 (June 1995); Kenneth J. Fedor and William B. Werther, Jr., Making Sense of
Cultural Factors in International Alliances, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS (Spring 1995), 33, at 41.
For information about strategic alliances currently active in the Mexican telecommunications
market, see Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 16, at 30-34; LATIN FINANCE SUPPLEMENTS: MEXICO:
BUILDING FOR GROWTH 53 (Sept. 1996); Mexico Telecom Partnerships Forming Rapidly, supra
note 17, at 602; Griffith, supra note 10, at 32; Torres, supra note 15, at A18.
48. The primary agreement (usually a "joint venture agreement" or an association agreement")
governing the association of the parties is structured according to the needs of the business, it
usually contains provisions relating to the formation and capital structure of the joint venture
company and the identity of the partners. It also provides for financial aspects such as mainte-
nance of books and records, financial reporting, audits, and profit distribution. Generally it
will contain extensive provisions as to termination, transfers of interests in the venture to third
parties, impasse, dispute resolution, and confidentiality of information. In addition, it may
address governance issues such as consensus, arms-length dealings, election of directors and
officers of subsidiaries. Discussion of treatment of all of the issues in the association agree-
ment is beyond the scope of this paper, which concentrates upon legal and operational issues
that impact most directly upon the business plan and operation of the new venture.
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partner (often a major financial institution49 50 51 or business conglomerate). Because
of the unreliability of the public telecommunications network, the local partner, more
often than not, will own or lease a private telecommunications network that covers the
entire country or all of the municipalities in the country where the local partner has
operations, branches, or retail outlets. The new joint venture often will use that private
network as a base upon which to build the network required to compete effectively with
the dominant provider.
B. THE LOCAL PARTNER'S PRIVATE NETWORK.
The operation of the local partner's private network, its expansion, and its even-
tual disposition give rise to a plethora of legal and business issues. The joint venture
agreement and ancillary documents address whether the existing private network will
remain the property of the local partner or will be contributed to the venture. In the for-
mer case, the existing network must be defined in exhibits to the agreement so that new
investments of the joint venture will not be confused with the property of the local part-
ner in the event of a subsequent unwind of the venture. In the latter case, the parties
must agree upon a fair valuation of the assets that the local partner will contribute, as well
as consider the tax ramifications to the local partner and the joint venture of the contri-
bution. If the existing network is contributed to the venture, additional legal issues arise
as to the transferability of the permits and licenses for network operation.
The parties must also decide who will purchase and own additions to the exist-
ing network the joint venture or the in country partner. Issues of ownership of network
improvements and operation and management control of the network can be particularly
sensitive to the local partner, which relies upon the private telecommunications network
to run its core business, (such as a national bank or an insurance operation). The local
partner will negotiate for the right to use the network under all circumstances to operate
its core business. The strategic investor will seek contractual assurance that if the local
49. In Mexico, for example, MCI partnered with Banamex to form Avantel. GTE initially part-
nered with Grupo Financiero Bancomer, S.A. to form the Unicorn joint venture (which even-
tually merged into the Alestra venture). See Glover and Lotvedt, supra note 16, at 32-33.
Banamex and Bancomer are among Mexico's largest banking institutions.
The banks entering into such strategic alliances desire to improve their telecommunications
quality and service while reducing the expense of their communications. Banks also seek
growth opportunities in handling fund transfers between businesses, both within the country
and internationally. See Nicholas Bray & Paul B. Carroll, Banks Go to the Source to Cut Phone
Bills: Communications Companies Find Allies in Major Customers, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct.
6, 1995, at p. A10 for a sampling of international bank-phone alliances.
50. Financial institutions are likely to own private telecommunications networks because of the
enormous amounts of data that they must transmit between branches and headquarters, many
9f which require long distance service.
51. When the local partner is a bank, due diligence should include verification of whether bank
and bank holding company laws restrict the amount of ownership interest that a bank may
hold in a non-bank investment. The organizational documents of the bank should also be
reviewed for provisions that limit the bank's ability to invest in and own subsidiaries.
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partner withdraws from participation in the joint venture or terminates the association,
the telecommunications venture will be able to continue. The relative importance of
issues relating to the existing network diminishes as the new network is built and the local
partner shifts from reliance upon its old private network to the new facilities operated by
the joint venture company.
C. TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES OF THE PARTNERS.
Another important operational issue is the foreign telecommunications part-
ner's provision of technical assistance and management services to the venture. The ven-
ture will exploit the technical expertise and managerial experience of the strategic
investor in telecommunications operations to gain significant competitive advantage in
the opening market. The parties may execute a separate agreement covering the foreign
partner's services. 5 2 Similarly, the local partner may also provide special services or bene-
fits to the venture. For example, many local partners already have a loyal customer base
and can provide customer lists or design and implement strategic marketing and sales
programs for the new telecommunications products offered.5 3
D. TRADEMARKS AND TRADE NAMES.
In connection with marketing telecommunications services, the parties must
also determine whether, and under what circumstances the venture will be entitled to use
trademarks, trade names, service marks and logos of the partners. The parties should
then sign appropriate license agreements. The local partner may negotiate for the licenses
to be exclusive in the country where the joint venture operates with respect to telecom-
munications services provided by the joint venture. In that case, the license agreement
should contain exceptions to the exclusivity of the license with respect to any enterprises
that are grandfathered or otherwise permitted under the covenant not to compete.
52. An agreement covering the services of the strategic investor may include, without limitation,
procedures for the identification and coordination of the scope of services, compensation for
services rendered, reimbursement of expenses, taxes (including withholding), rates and provi-
sions for revision of rates in extenuating circumstances, ownership of work product and intel-
lectual property, including license of intellectual property rights, right to audit and confiden-
tiality of information.
53. Where the local partner is a bank or a financial institution, banking law may restrict the use of
customer lists and credit information on the grounds of customer privacy. In an agreement for
marketing services of the local partner, issues would include, for example, the local partner's
obligation to make its customer lists available to the joint venture, ownership rights in the cus-
tomer list, the right of the local partner to approve and control mailings and other marketing
projects using the customer lists, access of the joint venture to the data base of the local partner
and access of the joint venture to information other than addresses about the customers of the
local partner. The local partner may also agree to provide the assistance of its senior manage-
ment for contacts with potential major accounts.
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E. NON-COMPETITION PROVISIONS.
Restrictions upon the parties' ability to compete with the venture, both during
the term of the association and after termination, are critical to the partners. Potentially
at stake is the right of the strategic investor to play in a major growth market comprised
of an entire country. In many cases, the strategic investor may already be operating or
own an interest in enterprises that compete with the new venture in that country. For
example, a foreign telecommunications company might venture with a local partner to
compete in the long distance market and to operate as a full service telecommunications
company upon expiration of the exclusivity period. The foreign telecommunications
company might already have a cellular license in the country or have an investment in a
consortium that provides value-added or other telecommunications services in the coun-
try. The partners face the challenge of agreeing upon non-competition language that
protects the legitimate prior business interest of the strategic investor by "grandfathering"
those competing operations, but also protects the new venture.
In addition to owning existing competing enterprises, the strategic investor may
also be negotiating pending transactions in the country even as it signs a memorandum of
understanding or other commitment to negotiate the joint venture agreement with the
local partner. In that event, it may be possible to bring the pending transaction into the
joint venture. Assuming that the third parties involved accept the local partner and the
venture, then the local partner acquires an indirect interest in the pending transaction
based upon its percentage of ownership in the joint venture. The local partner may com-
pensate the strategic investor for the local partner's pro rata share of any expenses incurred
and license fees paid by the strategic investor in creating the business opportunity.
Depending upon the nature of the business of the strategic investor and of the local
partner, the non-competition provisions may contain additional exceptions. For example,
the strategic investor and its affiliates may need to protect their right to sell telecommunica-
tions equipment and systems and spare parts in country, as well as to provide installation
and maintenance services. The strategic investor may also need to protect its right to provide
consulting and training services in matters such as network design and billing systems to
support business that it already conducts in the country. Likewise, depending on the nature
of its core business, the local partner may also need to protect its right to supply products
and services in country, such as financial services, data processing services and data storage
and retrieval. One way to preserve the financial viability of the venture in the face of such
exceptions to the restrictions on scope of permissible activity of the partners is to require the
partners to the offer the competing products and services to the venture on at least as favor-
able terms and conditions as they are offered to third parties.
To further protect the parties and build greater flexibility into the operation of
the non-competition covenants, the parties may create a mechanism whereby the venture
has the right of first refusal to commercially exploit new competitive opportunities. The
parties must present all such new opportunities to the venture. If declined by the venture
within a specified time, the new business may be pursued by the presenting party apart
from the venture without the restictions of the non-competition language.
Winter 1997 85
IV. Competitive Entry Stage.
The last stage of entry into the opening telecommunications market of a Latin
American is competitive entry. This is the stage during which the start-up company
formed by the venture partners emerges to seek recognition as a player in the soon-to-be
competitive market place. This lively stage is characterized by the implementation of a
business plan for the start-up company and the application for a concession and other
required licenses. With the placement of personnel and the commencement of opera-
tions, this is also a critical time in a venture for cross-cultural communication and adap-
tation, in terms of differing national cultures as well as corporate cultures.54 In this stage,
responsibility for much of the legal work transitions from the transactional lawyers repre-
senting the partners in negotiating the new venture to counsel for the joint venture com-
pany, which may consist of a local lawyer, an expatriate lawyer from the country of the
strategic investor, or both.
A. BUSINESS PLAN IMPLEMENTATION.
Certain legal activities usually occur in connection with the business plan imple-
mentation. The joint venture company that will operate in the local market is formed
and its partners make capital contributions to fund the start-up of operations. If the
local partner has already registered in the country's trademark office a trademark, trade
name or service marks for products and services that the venture will offer, then the regis-
trations should be transferred from the local partner to the venture. 55 The joint venture
company must obtain appropriate import licenses or authorizations from the country.
The venture must apply to the telecommunications authority for licenses and permits
that it needs to render the services contemplated by its business plan. Even if the venture
is formed substantially in advance of the opening of competition in basic services, the
venture may apply for permits and licenses related to value-added and other services that
are already competitive.
54. See Making Sense of Cultural Factors in International Alliances, supra note 47, at 42. When the
new company unfolds its business plan in a highly competitive environment, the resolution of
internal management issues is critical to permit the venture to focus on survival and growth
challenges. Factors such as the organizational chart, control, communication with employees,
the flow of management information and reward systems all may vary with national culture
and company culture. Those differences must be integrated to some extent to avoid ambiguity
and disharmony. Id. at 42, 46. Management of the parent companies may enhance the chances
of success for the venture by rejecting the idea that the cultural preferences of their
country/company are superior and by recognizing, respecting and capitalizing upon cultural
differences. Id. at 46.
55. In order to expedite the application process for trademarks and trade names, the partners may
decide to apply for the marks in the name of the local partner before or concurrently with the
incorporation of the joint venture company and transfer them to the joint venture later. This
strategy allows the early reservation of names and marks before other competitors entering the
market can secure them.
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Any ancillary contracts between the partners, the terms of which they negotiated
in connection with the joint venture agreement, may need to be executed. These might
include, for example, the lease or assignment of the local partner's existing private
telecommunications system to the venture, a network management agreement relating to
the private network, services agreements between each partner and the joint venture and
trademark licenses from each partner to the joint venture. Also, contracts with third par-
ties, such as floor space leases, equipment leases, supply purchase agreements and
employment agreements with key executives of the new venture company will be execut-
ed. If the joint venture plans to construct new network facilities, then the venture must
also select a contractor and enter into contracts for design engineering and construction.
B. THE CONCESSION APPLICATION.
One of the most critical aspects of the competitive entry stage is obtaining the
concession. The government's willingness to grant concessions may depend on whether
the government intends to foster post-privatization full competition in the telecommuni-
cations sector, 56 or, at least initially, to limit competition to two or three service
providers.57 Other political considerations may come into play as well.58
56. In opening its long distance market to competition, Mexico's government has chosen a very
open liberalization. According to Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes ("SCT") Carlos
Ruiz Sacristin, by this liberal approach Mexico seeks to create the regulatory environment for
the country to attract large investments in telecommunications. In response, by August of
1996 the government had granted nine concessions. Avantel, a joint venture between Grupo
Financiero Banamex-Accival and MCI has invested almost US$900 million to complete a 5,300
kilometer fiber-optic network. Alestra, a joint venture between AT&T, GTE, Telef6nica
Internacional of Spain and Grupo Alfa and Grupo Visa is building a 4,600 kilometer fiber-
optic network that will be ready in 1997. Mexico: Building for Growth, supra note 47, at 52-53.
57. In Argentina, for example, the key players are Telefonica and Telecom, each of which holds a
regional monopoly in local and long distance voice services until 1997 (subject to extension
until 2000 if the companies comply with predefined investment plans and quality standards),
and Telintar (owned by Telefonica and Telecom), which holds a monopoly in international toll.
See Case of Argentina, supra note 14, at 49; GLOBAL TELECOMS BUSINESS: THE AMERICAS
YEARBOOK 1996, supra note 14, at 7. See also Valcarcel, supra note 14, at A9 (protesting
Argentine telephone monopolies and suggesting change in policy).
58. The concession and the services that it permits the operator to provide go directly to the heart
of the business plan. For example, Bell Atlantic invested US$1 billion in Grupo lusacell, S.A. in
1993. The intention of the investment was to enter the telephone market by converting a 1957
rural radio-phone concession into a second local telephone network. Bell Atlantic asserts that
it received the assurance of then-President Carlos Salinas de Gortari that lusacell would be per-
mitted to extend its rural telephone network into urban areas, directly competing with Telmex.
President Salinas left office in 1994, and the new administration contends that Iusacell had a
series of authorizations that were granted under the old telecommunications law and the new
law provides that changes in the uses of existing licenses require government approval. For
months the implementation of the business plan is stymied while lusacell and the government
dispute the matter. See Joel Millman, Bell Atlantic Gets Hung Up in Mexico, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, May 9, 1996, at A10.
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Another factor that can impact the venture's ability to obtain a concession is
covenants between the government and the dominant operator in the concession agree-
ment with the dominant operator. The concession agreement may preclude the govern-
ment from granting concessions to other operators with terms more favorable than those
afforded to the dominant operator after the expiration of the exclusivity period. Also the
concession agreement between the government and the dominant operator may require
the government to ensure that concessions for the provision of services that enjoyed pro-
tection during the exclusivity period are granted only to "qualified" operators who must
use certain technology, meet requirements to supply public pay telephones and meet ser-
vice quality requirements and minimum waiting periods for new service.
The concession application must contain the information required by statute,
regulations and other governmental guidelines. 59 Once the application is submitted, the
59. In Peru, for example, the application of a corporation or other legal entity for a concession to the
Ministry of Transportation, Communications, Housing and Construction must contain: (i) a cer-
tified copy of the applicant's charter document and power of attorney of the applicant's legal rep-
resentative; (ii) the identity of applicant's partners or shareholders; (iii) a swom statement that the
applicant is not prohibited from executing contracts with the government and is not excluded
from obtaining a concession by restrictions contained in the telecommunications law or regula-
tions; (iv) a technical description of the project authorized by a qualified engineer; and (v) a fore-
cast of the first five year's investment, and of the first year's investment, which shall not be less than
10% of the five year forecast. See Regulamentos de la Ley Telecomunicationes, supra note 40, art. 163.
In Mexico, the statute requires a concession application to install, operate or exploit public
telecommunications network to contain (i) the name and address of the applicant; (ii) the ser-
vices the applicant wishes to provide; (iii) the technical specifications of the project; (iv) the pro-
grams and commitments regarding the investment, geographic coverage and the quality of ser-
vices the applicant proposes to provide; (iv) the business plan; and (v) documentation demon-
strating the financial, technical, legal and administrative ability and qualifications of the appli-
cant. Federal Law of Telecommunications, published in El Diario June 7, 1995, art. 24. To amplify
upon to the statutory requirements for concession applications, the SCT published detailed
guidelines outlining the procedure to obtain a concession. See Secretaria de Comunicaciones y
Transportes Acuerdo por el que se Establece el Procedimiento para Obtenir Concesion para la
Instalacion, Operacion o Explotacion de Redes Publicas de Telecomunicaciones Interestatales, al
Amparo de la Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones, D.O., September 4, 1995, (Mex.) [hereinafter
SCT Guidelines.] The SCT Guidelines require, among other things, detailed disclosure of the
equipment that will constitute the network, including the standards and technology to be used
for transmission, switching, signalling and synchronization, geographic coverage and expansion
plans, interconnection points, market analysis, pricing strategy, marketing strategy, service quali-
ty controls, pricing, billing and collection, personnel, qualifications and training. In addition, the
SCT Guidelines call for the organizational documents (estatutos) of the applicant to contain
statements to the general effect that (i) the purpose of the company is to install, operate or
exploit a public telecommunications network, (ii) the company is Mexican, (iii) the duration of
the company will be at least the term of the concession, (iv) that at least 51% of the share capital
and the effective control of the company will at all times remain in Mexican investors, and (v) in
the case of any disposition or transfer of shares representing 10% or more of the company's capi-
tal the company must notify the SCT, which may object to the disposition or transfer.
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government usually has a statutory review period in which to grant the concession or
request additional information. 6 0
The concession itself must contain the information required by statute, regula-
tions and other governmental guidelines. 6 1 In addition to the statutorily mandated infor-
mation, the concession may contain restrictions and additional requirements of the con-
cessionaire. For example, the telecommunications regulator may require the concession-
aire to obtain prior authorization of the regulator to expand or reduce the coverage of the
network. The concession may restrict the right of the concessionaire to assign the rights
and obligations established in the concession, or, alternatively, may provide a mechanism
or procedure for such assignment. 6 2 The concession may also restrict the right of the
concessionaire (i) to provide the concession services through a subsidiary or affiliate
without the prior consent of the regulator or (ii) to grant powers of attorney or other
60. In Peru, for example, after the applicant submits its application to the Ministry of
Transportation, Communications, Housing and Construction, the Ministry has 60 calendar
days to approve the application if the Ministry considers it in order. Regulamentos de la Ley de
Telecomunicaciones art. 137. After the Ministry has reviewed the application and verified com-
pliance with the formal requirements, it will order the publication of a summary of the appli-
cation once in the official newspaper El Peruano and in a larger national circulation newspaper.
Icl. If the Ministry determines that the application should be discussed at a public hearing, the
publication will include a summons to the hearing. Id.
In Mexico, the SCT has up to 120 days to evaluate the application, during which it may request
additional information from the applicant. Once the statutory requirements are satisfied, then
the SCT shall grant the concession. Federal Law of Telecommunications art. 25.
61. Art. 52 of Peru's Telecommunications Act, for example, requires concessions to provide public
telecommunications services to indicate: (a) the duration of the concession; (b) the minimum
expansion plan of the service; (c) the specific cases in which subcontracting will be allowed;
(d) the coverage area of the service; (e) the compatibility of terminal equipment which may be
connected; (f) the guaranty of confidentiality of telecommunications; (g) tariffs; (h) terms for
the installation of the service; (i) characteristics and procedures to be followed for the connec-
tion of homologated terminals at connection points to the network and the termination points
of the corresponding network; (j) obligation to provide integrated services in its area of influ-
ence; (k) requirements as to quality of service; (1) rules for interconnection of services; and (in)
grounds for termination of the concession. See supra note 44.
In Mexico, the concession to install, operate or exploit a public telecommunications net-
work must include (i) the name and address of the concessionaire, (ii) the object of the conces-
sion, (iii) the services which the concessionaire is authorized to provide, (iv) the rights and oblig-
ations of the concessionaire, (v) the duration of the concession, (vi) the amount and terms of the
guaranty, if any, that the licensee must provide and (vii) the geographic coverage commitment of
the network. Once the concession is granted, the statute requires the publication of an extract of
the concession in El Diario Oficial at the concessionaire's expense. See Federal Law of
Telecommunications supra note 59, Art. 26.
62. See, e.g. art. 35, Mexican Federal Law of Telecommunications. The statute permits the termi-
nation of rights and obligations, including termination of the right to operate and exploit a
public telecommunications network, in order to transfer that right to another licensee provid-
ing similar services in the same geographic zone. The SCT will approve the termination of
rights beginning three years after the license was initially granted and only if the Federal
Commission on Competition issues a favorable opinion.
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authorization that enable an attorney-in-fact or agent of the concessionaire to exercise
the rights and obligations of the concession. The concession may also incorporate,
expressly or by reference, a condition regarding the concession the performance of provi-
sions of the concession application, such as geographic coverage, stages of network
expansion, service quality controls, and technical specifications.
C. TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND THE PROCUREMENT FUNCTION.
Another component of the competitive entry stage that impacts the business
plan is the procurement function for the new venture. 63 Foreign strategic investors in
Latin America are generally telecommunications giants. Some of them manufacture
telecommunications equipment; those who do not nevertheless have economically
advantageous relationships with manufacturers and suppliers of equipment that far sur-
pass the relationship that a start-up joint venture can negotiate.6 4 They have extensive
capability in their domestic procurement function for contract negotiation, manage-
63. New ventures during the competitive entry stage may have considerably greater flexibility in
equipment procurement than the privatized company has during its exclusivity period.
During privatization, before bid submission, equipment suppliers (particularly domestic sup-
pliers) may succeed in causing the state-owned telephone to sign contracts to accept equip-
ment and materials with no relation to the network expansion and modernization require-
ments. See, e.g.:, Case of Argentina, upra note 14, at 53. The newly privatized company may
thus be obligated to pay for equipment that the international operator would not have selected
for purchase because of considerations such as obsolescence, technical qualifications and stan-
dards requirements for network modernization, and the ability to obtain better prices and
terms from other suppliers. Moreover, in some such supply contracts executed before privati-
zation penalties for late payment or non-payment may greatly exceed market rates. Id.
As for future equipment purchases, the concession agreement may require competitive
bidding for purchases exceeding a threshold dollar amount. Id. The privatized company may
be restricted from supplying terminal equipment, and the conditions under which they may
provide installation and maintenance services for terminal equipment may be regulated. Id.
The privatized company may be obligated to give preference to existing domestic industry,
such as in Argentina, always and whenever purchasing from the domestic supplier does not
imply a price difference greater than 10%. Id.
64. For example, supplying the Iusacell-Bell Atlantic wireless leader in Mexico is Northern Telecom
of Canada which, in 1994, announced a $330 million contract to supply the infrastructure for
Iusacell's nationwide fixed wireless access network. In 1995 Nortel was instrumental in con-
structing the fiber optic network for Avantel, the joint venture between MCI and Banamex.
Nortel's Avantel contract was worth $380 million. Swafford, supra note 2, at 68. The AT&T spin-
off equipment manufacturing company, Lucent Technologies, has plants in Mexico and Brazil
that produce microelectronic and computer components and consumer product plants that pro-
duce telephone systems for residential and business customers. The firm provides basic infra-
structure equipment, cabling and network equipment, including fiber optic cable, outside plant
and central office switches. Customers include Mexico's Telmex and Brazil's Telebris. Scott
Weeks, AT&T Spin-off Poised to Create Tech Giant, LATINFINANCE, Mar. 1996, at 66.
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ment and compliance, purchasing, inventory control, warehousing, distribution, accep-
tance and fleet transportation program development. Therefore, during the competitive
entry stage the foreign investor is likely to undertake responsibility for the procurement
function in order to acquire equipment at favorable prices and fast enough to meet cus-
tomer demand in the face of fierce competition from other strategic alliances entering
the same market.
In establishing the supply function for the new venture, the partners should keep in
sight certain commitments contained in the joint venture agreement. For example, the
agreement may require that contractual relationships between the joint venture company
and its partners be at arms length. It may contain a covenant that transactions between a
partner and its affiliates, on the one hand, and the joint venture, on the other hand, must be
consistent with market conditions and on terms at least as favorable as terms granted to third
parties. The foreign partner may receive consideration from the joint venture for managing
the supply function. This consideration may be in the form of hourly rates for the foreign
parent's personnel services or a markup on the price of inventory purchased on behalf of the
venture to cover shipping, warehousing and inventory management. In either case, the
charges should be in accordance with the principles of the joint venture agreement.
Another joint venture agreement provision that warrants review during the
competitive entry stage and impacts procurement is the non-competition clause. The
joint venture agreement may provide that the foreign partner can sell equipment and ser-
vices to "grandfathered" competing enterprises so long as the foreign partner offers the
same terms and conditions to the joint venture. For example, a United States telecommu-
nications company might sell, install and maintain billing systems to third party cus-
tomers in the joint venture country and later provide the same service to the joint ven-
ture. The terms offered to the joint venture must be as favorable as the terms offered to
the third party customers. Competition of a partner with the joint venture can be a very
sensitive issue, and one of the most common reasons that strategic alliances fail is tension
among the partners about observance of the non-competition provisions.
In the specific case of a joint venture between United States and Mexican part-
ners, NAFTA may afford substantial advantages to the joint venture. Effective January 1,
1994, NAFTA eliminated duties on "category A" items, which included substantial cate-
gories of United States manufactured telecommunications infrastructure and consumer
equipment. 65 Included in this category are telecommunications line equipment, modems,
broadcasting equipment, and telecommunications parts.
66
65. North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) Art. 302.2).
66. Id. (For a discussion of the impact of NAFTA on the telecommunications markets, see Glover
& Lotvedt supra note 16, at 34-40).
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V. Conclusion.
Despite the maturation of the Latin American telecommunications sector, the
region will continue to attract foreign strategic investment. Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua,
Panama, Honduras, Paraguay, and El Salvador have already commenced their privatiza-
tion processes, and the sale of interests in their telephone companies will provide growth
opportunities for strategic investors. As more countries complete the
privatization/monopoly stage and open their markets to competition, strategic alliances
between foreign strategic investors and local partners will also continue to form.
Latin American countries may experience greater challenge in locating strategic
investors to bid in their privatization sales. This difficulty is partly due to a perception
that, other than Brazil, the best opportunities have already been bought and sold. Also,
some investors from the United States are allocating more of their capital and human
resources to the opportunities presented in the United States domestic market by the
emergence of competition in local and long distance services.
The modernization and expansion of telecommunications infrastructure by
strategic investors will create significant markets for telecommunications equipment and
materials. These markets will demand traditional consumer goods (such as telephones)
and the needs of privatized telephone companies (such as fiber optic cable, digital switch-
es and public pay telephones). Opportunities will also exist for growth markets such as
internet services, pagers and paging services, mobile telephones and services and personal
communications services.
The trends of privatization and the introduction of competition in Latin
American telecommunications will continue to present significant strategic investment
opportunities. Each government's long term vision for the structure of its country's
telecommunications sector will impact the timing, the extent and the value of those oppor-
tunities. The most basic alternatives for the government involve the number of competi-
tors, the timing of their market entry and the latitude afforded to the privatized company.
As in the case of Mexico, the government may seek to attract large investment through the
introduction of multiple competitors and the policy of allowing market forces to shape the
evolution of the sector. Alternatively, the government may choose a duopoly or oligopoly
regime in which regulation implements social objectives that were established as part of the
privatization regime and the enactment of the telecommunications laws.
In the underdeveloped Latin American telecommunications infrastructures,
most citizens lack telephones. The government must weigh the possible benefits of com-
petition against the need for the privatized company to profit sufficiently to expand the
infrastructure. Duopolies are easier to regulate and provide for an orderly transition
with relatively stable competitor dynamics. Allowing multiple competitors from the
beginning risks the rapid consolidation of competitors in the market and the possible
failure to realize objectives of infrastructure development because of lack of funds for
investment generated through profits.
The signals that the government gives of its long term vision for the sector's
market structure, perhaps less obvious at the time of the privatization bid, grow more
apparent with the approaching expiration of the exclusivity period. The strategic investor
may interpret these signals in planning whether and with which partner to form a strate-
gic alliance in the market of a given country. The government's vision for the sector may
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evolve during the years of the exclusivity period, changing as a result of elections and
political pressure, economic lobbying and progress in achieving social goals. By the time
that the government permits competitive entry into the market, regulatory policy that
takes into account the long term vision for the sector is being shaped. Such policy directly
impacts how much monetary investment and infrastructure development new competi-
tors will make and how they will market their services. Governmental policy also impacts
the ongoing valuation of the privatized company's concession to the foreign operator-
shareholder and its consortia and the resulting decision whether to hold or divest its
shares in the competitive market.
